Costes de agencia y de transacción como determinantes de las decisiones financierasun análisis de ecuaciones estructurales

  1. Gutiérrez Urzúa, Mauricio
unter der Leitung von:
  1. Juan Manuel Mascareñas Pérez-Iñigo Doktorvater

Universität der Verteidigung: Universidad Complutense de Madrid

Fecha de defensa: 21 von Oktober von 2008

Gericht:
  1. José Ramón Aragonés González Präsident
  2. Jesús Miguel López Zaballos Sekretär
  3. Prosper Lamothe Fernández Vocal
  4. Fernando Gómez-Bezares Pascual Vocal
  5. Manuel Monjas Barroso Vocal
Fachbereiche:
  1. Administración Financiera y Contabilidad

Art: Dissertation

Zusammenfassung

This research analyzes the impact of financial decisions within the agency theory framework, but considering two aspects, on the one hand the practical applicability of these theories to a different reality of "Anglo model" and moreover, implementing structural equation models(SEM) to evaluate financial decisions. The results show that the classic theory can be applied to a different reality; we find a positive effect of the debt on growth opportunities, a fact reaffirmed by the characteristics of supervision and control of the banks. Moreover, we note that companies finance their growth opportunities with its own resources, namely, firms face potential problems of sub-investment with its resources and problems of over-investment with external resources. Finally, the results encouraged the idea of the significance of the ownership structure over financial decisions, since it is clear the negative impact of ownership concentration on growth and positive relationship with debt. The results show a negative relationship between performance and concentration of ownership, a situation that encourages the idea of inefficiency. The affiliation to a conglomerate shows a negative impact on growth opportunities and positive on debt. There is a direct link between concentration of ownership and liquidity, associated with higher rights of cash flows control. These complex corporate structures, increase e incentives to expropriate minority shareholders, forming a shield to avoid "possible" takeovers, eliminating one of the natural ways the efficiency of corporate governance...