On the Analogy between Cognitive Representation and Truth
- Suárez, Mauricio
- Solé, Albert
ISSN: 0495-4548
Année de publication: 2006
Volumen: 21
Número: 55
Pages: 39-48
Type: Article
D'autres publications dans: Theoria: an international journal for theory, history and foundations of science
Résumé
In this paper we claim that the notion of cognitive representation (and scientific representation in particular) is irreducibly plural. By means of an analogy with the minimalist conception of truth, we show that this pluralism is compatible with a generally deflationary attitude towards representation. We then explore the extent and nature of representational pluralism by discussing the positive and negative analogies between the inferential conception of representation advocated by one of us and the minimalist conception of truth.
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