Desmontando la máquinalas razones de Putnam contra el funcionalismo

  1. Rodríguez González, Mariano Luis
Journal:
Logos: Anales del Seminario de Metafísica

ISSN: 1575-6866

Year of publication: 2006

Issue: 39

Pages: 53-76

Type: Article

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Abstract

This paper examines in the first place the putnamian foundation of the so-called "table machine functionalism", in order, mainly, to be able to review the reasons that led the American thinker to abandon the functionalist theory of mind, and also to refute all the program of intentionality naturalization. Hereafter, and in view of the fact that the arguments that have been opposed to Putnam ever since are generally poor and not much convincing, the conclusion we arrive to is pointing out the necessity of a critical consideration of the philosophical foundations of the computational model in cognitive psychology, taken as the sophisticated development of modern materialism, in the sense of the critique of ideologies.

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