Criterios y factores de calidad institucionalLun estudio empírico

  1. Alonso Rodríguez, José Antonio
  2. Garcimartín Alférez, Carlos Eugenio
Aldizkaria:
Revista de economía aplicada

ISSN: 1133-455X

Argitalpen urtea: 2011

Alea: 19

Zenbakia: 55

Orrialdeak: 5-32

Mota: Artikulua

Beste argitalpen batzuk: Revista de economía aplicada

Laburpena

El presente trabajo pretende aportar nuevas evidencias acerca de los factores que determinan la calidad institucional. Dada las deficiencias que presentan los indicadores existentes al respecto, una primera parte se orienta a discutir los criterios exigibles a una institución de calidad. Sobre esos criterios se definen las relaciones que serán objeto de exploración en el trabajo empírico posterior. De acuerdo a los resultados obtenidos, son el propio nivel de desarrollo, la equidad en la distribución de la renta, la existencia de un sistema impositivo eficaz y el nivel educativo los principales determinantes de la calidad institucional. Por el contrario, algunas de las variables tradicionalmente planteadas en la literatura (localización geográfica, fragmentación étnica, tradición jurídica u origen colonial) o bien no tienen incidencia en la calidad institucional una vez que se controla por el nivel de desarrollo o su efecto es indirecto, a través de las variables anteriormente mencionadas.

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