Sensibilidad de la oferta de capital riesgo a cambios en el marco regulatorio

  1. Balboa Ramón, Marina
  2. Martí Pellón, José
Revue:
Revista de economía aplicada

ISSN: 1133-455X

Année de publication: 2011

Volumen: 19

Número: 55

Pages: 61-94

Type: Article

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D'autres publications dans: Revista de economía aplicada

Résumé

Este trabajo analiza la eficacia de dos cambios regulatorios sobre la captación de fondos de capital riesgo. En particular, se estudia el efecto de cambios en la tasa impositiva sobre las ganancias de capital y la introducción de una legislación específica que regula la actividad de capital riesgo. Considerando la población de entidades de capital riesgo en España en el periodo 1991-2007, los resultados muestran la eficacia de la introducción de una regulación específica que pretende limitar la doble tributación y aportar seguridad jurídica a los inversores. Por el contrario, no se encuentra suficiente evidencia del efecto de una reducción impositiva en las ganancias de capital en la tributación de las personas físicas, quizá por el efecto indirecto que tiene a través de la demanda de capital riesgo. Estos resultados son importantes para el regulador pues señalan la efectividad de determinadas normas encaminadas al desarrollo de los mercados de capital riesgo.

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