La "aportación" de Kant al proyecto heideggeriano de una ontología fundamental

Abstract

This paper will focus on an essential Heideggerian text: The Basic Problems of Phenomenology, 1927. At that time the author of Being and Time continues to be immersed in his fundamental ontology project, which considers the question of being. In this context, Heidegger focuses on the actual Dasein and wonders about its real way of being. In a dialogue with Kant he discovers that what specifically defines the human being is his or her moral personality, the action. Heidegger highlights this find, but at the same time regrets that Kant was unable to educe the consequences of his own discovery. Contrary to tradition, the thinker from Freiburg establishes an ontological difference between the Dasein and the rest of beings. The nature of the first is existence; for the rest it is subsistence.