A revenue equivalence result in a duopolistic electricity market where one of the suppliers has two production units

1. Alonso, Estrella
2. Tejada Cazorla, Juan Antonio

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Abstract

In this paper we will model the electricity market auction as a twoperson game with incomplete information under the assumption that bidders are asymmetric in units production, risk neutral and with unknown values. We characterize the strictly monotone bayesian Nash equilibrium and we rank a family of auction models which contains the classic models Uniform, Discriminatory and Vickrey auction models.

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