Contextos de descubrimiento causal
ISSN: 0034-8244, 1988-284X
Año de publicación: 2012
Número: 37
Páginas: 27-36
Tipo: Artículo
Otras publicaciones en: Revista de filosofía
Resumen
Se distinguen dos acepciones del término �contexto de descubrimiento�: La acepción tradicional, que lo contrasta con el contexto de la justificación, y otra, más reciente, que lo relaciona con la metodología de inferencia causal. Curiosamente, el propio Reichenbach suscribió la segunda acepción, y no es coincidencia que su aportación al desarrollo del campo del descubrimiento causal haya sido capital. Se defiende la vigencia de esta metodología en todas las ciencias empíricas, incluidas las ciencias físicas.
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