¿Se financió la defensa a costa del gasto social y la economía en el siglo XX? El dilema cañones versus mantequilla

  1. Jurado Sánchez, José
Revista:
Hacienda Pública Española / Review of Public Economics

ISSN: 0210-1173

Año de publicación: 2012

Número: 203

Páginas: 89-117

Tipo: Artículo

DOI: 10.7866/HPE-RPE.12.4.4 DIALNET GOOGLE SCHOLAR lock_openAcceso abierto editor

Otras publicaciones en: Hacienda Pública Española / Review of Public Economics

Resumen

Las interrelaciones entre el gasto militar y el civil y sus consecuencias económicas y sociales duranteel siglo XX han sido objeto de numerosas investigaciones desde hace varias décadas. En las publica-das hasta mediados del decenio de 1970 se defiende que el gasto social y la economía sufragaron la de-fensa, mientras que en la mayoría de las editadas después se sostiene que los cañones no se fabricarona costa de la mantequilla o no se hallan pruebas consistentes de lo contrario. Esta diversidad de resul-tados se debe a las diferentes teorías, metodologías y técnicas estadísticas utilizadas en la investigaciónde un asunto que sería de gran interés iniciar en España.

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Fuente de los datos: Dialnet