Some results on stability concepts for matching models
ISSN: 2341-2356
Año de publicación: 2010
Número: 4
Páginas: 1-12
Tipo: Documento de Trabajo
Otras publicaciones en: Documentos de Trabajo (ICAE)
Resumen
We consider a general class of two-sided matching markets, called many-to-one matching markets with money. For a special case of these markets, where each seller owns di¤erent objects, we prove that stable outcomes cannot be characterized by the non-existence of unsatis�ed pairs. Moreover, we restore the dual lattice structure in markets with more than one seller using a connection with an assignment game.
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