Cuestiones sobre coherentismo: una visita guiada
ISSN: 1130-0507
Argitalpen urtea: 2011
Zenbakien izenburua: Razón, crisis y utopía. (V Congreso Internacional de la Sociedad Académica de Filosofía)
Zenbakia: 4
Orrialdeak: 149-158
Mota: Artikulua
Beste argitalpen batzuk: Daimon: revista internacional de filosofía
Laburpena
In the contemporary epistemological reflection there have been a large number of issues that have grown around coherentist theories of truth and justification. In this paper I shall propose several distinctions that have been systematically organized and that could help us as a guide to see how all these problems fit together and are intertwined. Basically all these distinctions have to do with the descriptive and normative aspects that have the following questions: What is the belief that has knocked on the door of our belief system? Is it rational to accept such a belief? Which have been the logical procedures that have been used to accommodate the new belief? Are these processes reliable or rational? How have we built the system of belief from which we start? Has been this process rational? What structure has our belief system? Could we revise rationally such a structure? Is the resulting system of beliefs truth or rational?
Erreferentzia bibliografikoak
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