Age based preferences in paired kidney exchange

  1. Piave, Nicolò Antonio
  2. Rodríguez Álvarez, Carmelo
Revista:
Documentos de Trabajo (ICAE)

ISSN: 2341-2356

Año de publicación: 2013

Número: 38

Páginas: 1-50

Tipo: Documento de Trabajo

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Otras publicaciones en: Documentos de Trabajo (ICAE)

Resumen

We consider a model of Paired Kidney Exchange (PKE) with feasibility constraints on the number of patient-donor pairs involved in exchanges. Patients' preferences are restricted so that patients prefer kidneys from compatible younger donors to kidneys from older donors. In this framework, patients with compatible donors may enroll on PKE programs to receive an organ with higher expected graft survival than that of their intended donor. PKE rules that satisfy individual rationality, eciency, and strategy-proofness necessarily select pairwise exchanges. Such rules maximize the number of transplantations among pairs with the youngest donors, and sequentially among pairs with donors of dierent age groups.

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Fuente de los datos: Dialnet