Learning and coordinating in a multilayer network

  1. Lugo, Haydeé
  2. San Miguel Ruibal, Maximino
Revista:
Documentos de Trabajo (ICAE)

ISSN: 2341-2356

Año de publicación: 2014

Número: 30

Páginas: 1-16

Tipo: Documento de Trabajo

DIALNET GOOGLE SCHOLAR lock_openDocta Complutense editor

Otras publicaciones en: Documentos de Trabajo (ICAE)

Resumen

We introduce a two layer network model for social coordination incorporating two relevant ingredients: a) different networks of interaction to learn and to obtain a pay-off, and b) decision making processes based both on social and strategic motivations. Two populations of agents are distributed in two layers with intralayer learning processes and playing interlayer a coordination game. We find that the skepticism about the wisdom of crowd and the local connectivity are the driving forces to accomplish full coordination of the two populations, while polarized coordinated layers are only possible for all-to-all interactions. Local interactions also allow for full coordination in the socially efficient Pareto-dominant strategy in spite of being the riskier one.

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