Hasta que la muerte -o el divorcio- nos separe. Cómo una regla por defecto eficiente puede mejorar el bienestar social (y evitar discusiones incómodas en la pareja)
ISSN: 0422-2784
Year of publication: 2015
Issue Title: Análisis económico del derecho
Issue: 398
Pages: 65-78
Type: Article
More publications in: Economía industrial
Abstract
We analyze the standard legal rules on the economics of marriage applying concepts from Behavioral Law and Economics. We applied bounded rationality and choice architecture implications. We consider that the most common default rule for the economic marriage regime in Spanish regions is not the best in efficiency terms, and we propose a change in favor of the alternative rule (separation of property). Moreover, we propose some nudges as a second best solution
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