Filosofía Experimental y Economía Experimentalun enfoque híbrido

  1. Fernando Aguiar
  2. Antonio Gaitán
  3. Blanca Rodríguez López
Revista:
Isegoría: Revista de filosofía moral y política

ISSN: 1130-2097

Año de publicación: 2014

Número: 51

Páginas: 623-648

Tipo: Artículo

DOI: 10.3989/ISEGORIA.2014.051.05 DIALNET GOOGLE SCHOLAR lock_openAcceso abierto editor

Otras publicaciones en: Isegoría: Revista de filosofía moral y política

Resumen

En este artículo presentamos las principales corrientes de la Filosofía Experimental y atendemos a una de las críticas más severas a la que se ha sometido este reciente programa de renovación metodológica. Según Antti Kauppinen la Filosofía Experimental está condenada al fracaso porque no puede obtener mediante sus métodos el tipo de intuiciones que interesan a los filósofos –las intuiciones robustas del hablante competente. Aun aceptando parte de las críticas de Kauppinen, en este artículo sostenemos, en primer lugar, que la supuesta incapacidad de la Filosofía Experimental para acceder a las intuiciones robustas de los hablantes tiene que ver en gran medida con los métodos experimentales empleados hasta ahora por los filósofos experimentales. En segundo lugar, defendemos que el proyecto de reforma llevado a cabo desde la Filosofía Experimental resultará viable solo si se adoptan una serie de consejos metodológicos procedentes de la economía experimental. Únicamente entonces podrán los experimentalistas responder con éxito a la objeción de Kauppinen.

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Fuente de los datos: Dialnet