Hilary Putnam y la nostalgia del pragmatismo
ISSN: 2386-8066
Any de publicació: 2018
Volum: 5
Número: 1
Pàgines: 73-90
Tipus: Article
Altres publicacions en: Análisis. Revista de investigación filosófica
Resum
The aim of this paper is to offer a brief survey of the relationship between Hilary Putnam and pragmatism. In the first and second sections I comment on Putnam’s philosophical shift from “orthodox” analytic philosophy to “neopragmatism”, and take a look at his controversy with Richard Rorty concerning the meaning of pragmatism. The third section points at Putnam’s and Rorty’s rejection of the Peircean definition of truth as a key issue to account for the differences between neopragmatist philosophers and classic pragmatists (including Dewey). The final section draws some conclusions from the previous discussion concerning the “narrative” of contemporary pragmatism.