El modelo británico de nombramientos judiciales«Judicial independence in law»

  1. Fernández Riveira, Rosa María 1
  1. 1 Universidad Complutense de Madrid
    info

    Universidad Complutense de Madrid

    Madrid, España

    ROR 02p0gd045

Zeitschrift:
Teoría y realidad constitucional

ISSN: 1139-5583

Datum der Publikation: 2019

Nummer: 44

Seiten: 453-482

Art: Artikel

DOI: 10.5944/TRC.44.2019.26014 DIALNET GOOGLE SCHOLAR lock_openDialnet editor

Andere Publikationen in: Teoría y realidad constitucional

Zusammenfassung

This paper studies the Constitutional Reform Act published in the 2005 in United Kingdom. This important reform means a deep constitutional change in an unwritten constitution model. The first part shows, critically, the old model explaining how the judges were appointed. The second part analyses the new model in which the most relevant role is played by the Judicial Appointments Commission, this new public body designed as recommendation body appoints the Judiciary in United Kingdom and it’s being representative of the deepest change amid the classical concept of Judicial independence. More than ten years before the JAC’s creation, important inputs could be commented.

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