Escepticismo, tragedia y vulnerabilidad cognitivaUna lección de Cavell

  1. Javier Vilanova Arias
Revue:
Análisis. Revista de investigación filosófica

ISSN: 2386-8066

Année de publication: 2019

Volumen: 6

Número: 2

Pages: 167-185

Type: Article

DOI: 10.26754/OJS_ARIF/A.RIF.201924060 DIALNET GOOGLE SCHOLAR lock_openDialnet editor

D'autres publications dans: Análisis. Revista de investigación filosófica

Résumé

Stanley Cavell’s idea of “the truth in scepticism” is revisited, first by following classic interpretations, second by comparing it with Wittgenstein epistemological approach in On Certainty, and finally by applying Cavell own treatment of shakespearean drama. The analysis concludes that the core of the notion points to the existential or vital side of epistemic fallibilism, what is related to the notion of cognitive vulnerability