Palabras y acciones como mecanismos de coordinación

  1. Aurora García Gallego 1
  2. Amalia Rodrigo González 2
  1. 1 Universitat Jaume I
    info

    Universitat Jaume I

    Castelló de la Plana, España

    ROR https://ror.org/02ws1xc11

  2. 2 Universitat de València
    info

    Universitat de València

    Valencia, España

    ROR https://ror.org/043nxc105

Revista:
Economía industrial

ISSN: 0422-2784

Año de publicación: 2019

Título del ejemplar: Economía conductual

Número: 413

Páginas: 61-72

Tipo: Artículo

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Otras publicaciones en: Economía industrial

Resumen

We present an experimental finitely repeated game with two players and two actions based on García-Gallego et al. (2018). Such frame is suitable for the analysis of coordination among players under asymmetric information. Two treatments are run in order to analyse the effect of a pre-play chat online in which players have the possibility to exchange open messages. A measure of efficiency is proposed that allows for identifying the random component of coordination and, therefore, testing the relation between the non-random component and the online communication. A positive significant relation is found between the payoffs from the non-random coordination and effective time of online communication. Elaborated communication strategies implying a high degree of coordination are detected.

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