Análisis de las decisiones individuales en contextos de negociación. Aportes teórico y experimental

Resum

This thesis studies experimentally the conditions that improve bargaining power using threats in a negotiation process. The analysis is focused on three essential elements of commitment theory: the possibility of a player to announce his own actions, the credibility of these messages, and the experience acquired in the negotiation process. For this aim, we choose the hawk-dove game with perfect information because it is a stylized negotiation environment with an unequal distribution of wealth in equilibrium. The experimental data shows that, in the first period, subjects are not aware of the bargaining power of commitment. When the game is repeated and experience increases, subjects quickly understand the advantages of threatening, turning the payoffs into their favor. The credibility of messages is also relevant, given that in some cases subjects lie strategically, reducing their own bargaining power.