School Choice with Transferable Students' Characteristics

  1. Carmelo Rodríguez-Álvarez 1
  2. Antonio Romero-Medina 2
  1. 1 Universidad Complutense de Madrid
    info

    Universidad Complutense de Madrid

    Madrid, España

    ROR 02p0gd045

  2. 2 Universidad Carlos III de Madrid
    info

    Universidad Carlos III de Madrid

    Madrid, España

    ROR https://ror.org/03ths8210

Revista:
Documentos de Trabajo (ICAE)

ISSN: 2341-2356

Año de publicación: 2020

Número: 4

Páginas: 1-31

Tipo: Documento de Trabajo

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Otras publicaciones en: Documentos de Trabajo (ICAE)

Resumen

We consider a school choice problem where schools' priorities depend on transferable students' characteristics. A school choice algorithm selects for each profile of students' preferences over schools an assignment of students to schools and a final allocation of characteristics (an extended matching). We define the Student Exchange with Transferable Characteristics (SETC) class of algorithms. Each SETC always selects a constrained efficient extended matching. That is an extended matching that i) is stable according to the priorities generated by the final allocation of characteristics and ii) is not Pareto dominated by another stable extended matching. Every constrained efficient extended matching that Pareto improves upon a stable extended matching can be obtained via an algorithm in the SETC class. When students' characteristics are fully transferable, a specific algorithm in the SETC family is equivalent to the application of the Top Trade Cycle Algorithm starting from the Student Optimal Stable Matching.

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Información de financiación

Rodríguez-Alvarez is grateful for the financial support from Fundación Ramón Areces and Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad (Proyectos Excelencia ECO2016-76818, PID2019-107161GB-C32). Romero-Medina acknowledges financial support from Ministerio Economía y Competitividad grants ECO2017-87769-P and MDM 2014-043, and Comunidad de Madrid H2019/HUM-5891.

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