Uptake¿entender o aceptar?

  1. Antonio Blanco Salgueiro 1
  1. 1 Universidad Complutense de Madrid
    info

    Universidad Complutense de Madrid

    Madrid, España

    ROR 02p0gd045

Journal:
Theoria: an international journal for theory, history and foundations of science

ISSN: 0495-4548

Year of publication: 2021

Volume: 36

Issue: 1

Pages: 63-79

Type: Article

DOI: 10.1387/THEORIA.21267 DIALNET GOOGLE SCHOLAR lock_openDialnet editor

More publications in: Theoria: an international journal for theory, history and foundations of science

Sustainable development goals

Abstract

Austin introduces the idea of securing the uptake in the context of dealing with the illocution-perlocution distinction. In recent times, the notion is employed by some neoaustinian scholars to argue that the uptake is what triggers the deontic effects (rights, duties, obligations, permissions, etc.) associated to an illocution. Here, a distinction is made between two kinds of uptake: uptake-as-understanding and uptake-as-accepting, and the stance that the second is the one needed for a plausible theory of speech action inspired by Austin’s original ideas is defended. When that notion is adopted, some old problems about speech action can be clarified.

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