El gobierno europeo de la crisis del coronavirus

  1. Marco Dani 1
  2. Agustín José Menéndez Menéndez 2
  1. 1 Universidad de Trento
  2. 2 Universidad Autónoma de Madrid
    info

    Universidad Autónoma de Madrid

    Madrid, España

    ROR https://ror.org/01cby8j38

Zeitschrift:
Revista de derecho constitucional europeo

ISSN: 1697-7890

Datum der Publikation: 2020

Nummer: 34

Art: Artikel

DIALNET GOOGLE SCHOLAR lock_openOpen Access editor

Andere Publikationen in: Revista de derecho constitucional europeo

Zusammenfassung

In this article we reconstruct and analyse the policies with which the European Union has tried to govern the economic crisis caused by the spread of covid-19, in their turn part of the long cycle of crises which may be referred as the existential crisis of the European. In February and early March it was assumed that the impact would be limited and the recovery rather quick; then, the full scale of the fallout was fully registered, and measures were taken to shelter the social and economic structure from damage, by means of an emergency suspension of the fundamental monetary and fiscal rules of the Eurozone. This created the legal and political space within which massive state intervention was possible. In the third and final phase, distributive questions have started to come to the fore as the crisis persists and plans to restructure the European socio-economic model are combined with conjunctural policies to relaunch economic activity. We conclude by offering a brief analysis of the policies adopted, highlighting the impact they may have on socio-economic and existential inequalities.

Bibliographische Referenzen

  • M. Pierce y otros, “Mental health before and during the COVID-19 pandemic: a longitudinal probability sample survey of the UK population”, The Lancet Psychiatry , vol. 7, núm. 10, 2020
  • Naciones Unidas, “Víctimas de la violencia doméstica atrapadas durante la pandemia”, https://www.un.org/es/coronavirus/articles/un-supporting-trapped-domestic-violence-victims-during-covid-19-pandemic
  • M. L. E vans , M. L indauer , y M. E. F arrell , “ A Pandemic within a Pandemic — Intimate Partner Violence during Covid-19”, New England Journal of Medicine , núm. 383, 2020
  • OCDE, “Turning Hope into Reality: OECD Economic Outlook, December 2020”, https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/sites/39a88ab1-en/index.html?itemId=/content/publication/39a88ab1-en .
  • S. Z izek , Pandemic!: COVID-19 Shakes the World , Polity, Londres, 2020 o C. L apavitsas , “ This Crisis Has Exposed the Absurdities of Neoliberalism. That Doesn't Mean It'll Destroy It ”, Jacobin , 27.03.2020, https://jacobinmag.com/2020/03/coronavirus-pandemic-great-recession-neoliberalism .
  • F. S charpf , “ The Joint-Decision Trap. Lessons From German Federalism and European Integration”, Public Administration , núm. 66, 1988, 239-78.
  • N. Nielsen , “How the EU's virus-alert agency failed”, EU Observer , 10 .04.2020, disponible en https://euobserver.com/coronavirus/148039 .
  • R. Milne , “ Sweden unlikely to feel economic benefit of no-lockdown approach”, Financial Times , 10.05.2020.
  • R. Milne , “ Sweden's death toll unnerves its Nordic neighbours”, Financial Times , 20 .05.2020.
  • C. Lagarde y L. de Guindos , “Introductory Statement (with Q&A)”, 12.03.2020, disponible en https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/pressconf/2020/html/ecb.is200312~f857a21b6c.en.html
  • E. B rancaccio y R. Realfonzo , “Approvare il MES senza poi doverlo usare è un'illusione”, Il Sole 24 Ore , 7.12.2020, disponible en https://www.econopoly.ilsole24ore.com/2020/12/07/approvare-il-mes-senza-usarlo-e-unillusione/ .
  • E. Jones , “When and how to deactivate the SGP general escape clause?”, Parlamento Europeo, Economic Governance Support Unit (EGOV)Directorate-General for Internal Policies , 25.11.2020, disponible en https://www.europarl.europa.eu/thinktank/en/document.html?reference=IPOL_IDA(2020)651378 .
  • M. Draghi , ‘ Draghi: we face a war against coronavirus and must mobilise accordingly', Financial Times , 25.03.2020.
  • O. Blanchard , A. Leandro y J. Zettelmeyer , “Redesigning the EU Fiscal Rules: From Rules to Standards”, 22/23.10.2020, disponible en https://tinyurl.com/blanchardfiscalrules .
  • F. Salmoni , “ L'insostenibile 'leggerezza' del Meccanismo europeo di stabilità. La democrazia alla prova dell'emergenza pandemica”, núm. 20, 24.06.2020, disponible en https://www.federalismi.it/nv14/articolo-documento.cfm?Artid=43700
  • M. Dani y A. J. Menéndez , “Soft-conditionality through soft-law: le insidie nascoste del Pandemic Crisis Support”, LaCostituzione.Info , 11.05.2020, disponible en http://www.lacostituzione.info/index.php/2020/05/10/soft-conditionality-through-soft-law-le-insidie-nascoste-del-pandemic-crisis-support/ .
  • “A French-German Initiative for the European Recovery from the coronavirus crisis”, disponible en https://www.bundesregierung.de/resource/blob/975226/1753772/414a4b5a1ca91d4f7146eeb2b39ee72b/2020-05-18-deutsch-franzoesischer-erklaerung-eng-data.pdf?download=1
  • L. Pellicer y C. Pérez , “Bruselas apremia a España a reformar las pensiones y el mercado laboral”, El País , 7.12.2020, disponible en https://elpais.com/economia/2020-12-06/bruselas-apremia-a-espana-a-reformar-las-pensiones-y-el-mercado-laboral.html .
  • S. Fleming , M. Peel y V. Hopkins , “ EU identity crisis: Poland, Hungary and the fight over Brussels' values”, Financial Times , 4.12.2020, disponible en https://www.ft.com/content/bfa58276-1868-4011-9891-ccd363dc68dc .
  • “European Stability Mechanism: Guideline on Precautionary Financial Assistance”, https://www.esm.europa.eu/sites/default/files/esm_guideline_on_precautionary_financial_assistance.pdf
  • A. Valzer , “Il Meccanismo Europeo di Stabilità Profili di diritto bancario”, en A. Mangia (ed.), Mes. L'Europa e il Trattato Impossibile , Scholé, Brescia, 2020, pp. 105-145, p.140.
Fuente de los datos: Dialnet