Calidad institucional y cohesión social: El corrosivo efecto de la desigualdad

  1. José Antonio ALONSO
Revista:
Papeles de economía española

ISSN: 0210-9107

Año de publicación: 2021

Título del ejemplar: La calidad de las instituciones y la economía española

Número: 168

Páginas: 20-33

Tipo: Artículo

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Otras publicaciones en: Papeles de economía española

Resumen

El artículo persigue mostrar que la desigualdad, especialmente cuando afecta a grupos sociales (desigualdad horizontal) y se acompaña de baja movilidad social, constituye un importante factor que deteriora la calidad de las instituciones. Para ello, analiza el papel que la desigualdad tiene entre los criterios de evaluación de la calidad institucional y discute el tipo de desigualdad que es más relevante por su impacto sobre las instituciones. A través del recurso a dos ejercicios empíricos, empleando métodos econométricos diferentes, se comprueba que la desigualdad es un determinante relevante (con signo negativo) de la calidad institucional. Las estimaciones sugieren que es difícil construir buenas instituciones en sociedades altamente fragmentadas, con niveles de desigualdad elevado y cronificado en el tiempo. Esos resultados inspiran una reflexión sobre el caso español en los años más recientes.

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