La clausura cognitiva permanece abierta

  1. Asier Arias Domínguez 1
  1. 1 IES Rosa Chacel (Madrid)
Revista:
Eikasía: revista de filosofía

ISSN: 1885-5679

Año de publicación: 2019

Número: 86

Páginas: 75-94

Tipo: Artículo

DIALNET GOOGLE SCHOLAR lock_openAcceso abierto editor

Otras publicaciones en: Eikasía: revista de filosofía

Resumen

La tesis de la clausura cognitiva es una de las propuestas misterianas más discutidas en filosofía de la mente. Tal y como reconoce Colin McGinn, principal valedor de dicha tesis, la misma consiste antes en la articulación de una intuición que en un argumento propiamente dicho. Ello no impide, no obstante, analizar y criticar los defectos y limitaciones de su formulación, a saber: su inconsistencia desde el punto de vista de la historia intelectual, su desatención a las disciplinas cuyas fronteras pretende trazar y, finalmente, la ambigüedad terminológica y la inadecuada concepción de la formación de conceptos que la sustentan.

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Fuente de los datos: Dialnet