Agencia racional e ilusión de libertad;Rational Agency and the Illusion of Freedom

  1. Sainz, Javier S.
Revista:
Mediaciones sociales

ISSN: 1989-0494

Año de publicación: 2007

Número: 1

Páginas: 305-326

Tipo: Artículo

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Otras publicaciones en: Mediaciones sociales

Resumen

Las ciencias sociales afrontan el problema de dar una explicación comprensiva a la ilusión del sujeto de que su acción deriva de una acción propositiva y consciente. La noción de libertad forma parte de ese complejo conceptual frente al que se enfrenta la noción de determinismo, el fundamento metateórico de una explicación científica. La experiencia de consciencia, de comportarse como un sujeto dotado de libre voluntad es una creación del cerebro y de la mente. Si los mecanismos neurales y psicológicos son responsables de la conducta, la noción de un sujeto que resuelve la acción, simultáneamente libre y causado, se desvanece o se revela ilusorio. El análisis econométrico de la conducta, en la economía experimental, ha mostrado que los fenómenos de inversión de preferencias en el tiempo y la inconsistencia de sus elecciones cuestionan la noción de un agente racional, concebido como un agente dotado de libre voluntad. Las acciones de un individuo cobran sentido en un juego social. Las posiciones de los actores en la estructura social determinan qué acciones pueden esperarse de éstos a partir de un tipo de interacción comunicativa que asocia recompensas y castigos a ciertos patrones de acción, conformando hábitos. El agente racional se conforma a partir de su experiencia de éxito o fracaso esperado en relación con ese patrón de recompensas y castigos provistos por actores de naturaleza corporativa. En esta contribución se discute, desde la neurociencia y la ciencia cognitiva, la noción de subjetividad y se discuten las relaciones entre agencia virtual y agencia racional.;The social sciences face the problem of giving a comprehensive explanation of the subject?s illusion of thinking that its action derives from a propositional and conscious action. The notion of freedom is part of this conceptual complex in opposition to the one that faces the notion of determinism, the meta-theoretical foundations of a scientific explanation. The experience of consciousness, of behaving as a subject provided with free will is a creation of the brain and the mind. If the neuronal and psychological mechanisms are responsible of behavior, the notion of a subject that resolves the action, simultaneously free and caused, vanishes or is revealed as an illusion. The econometrical analysis of the behavior, in the experimental economy, has showed that the phenomena of investment based on preferences in time and the inconsistency of his choices question the notion of a rational agent, understood as an agent provided with free will. The actions of an individual have sense in a social game. The positions of the actors in the social structure determine which actions can be expected from them depending on the type of communicative interaction that associates rewards and punishments with certain patterns of action, shaping habits. The rational agent is satisfied with its experience of success or failure with regards to this pattern of rewards and punishments provided by actors of a corporate nature. In this contribution we discuss from the perspective of neuroscience and cognitive science, the notion of subjectivity, as well as the relations between virtual agency and rational agency.

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