100 Años de debate sobre el «gobierno corporativo»La importancia del contexto

  1. José María Gondra Romero
Revista de derecho de sociedades

ISSN: 1134-7686

Year of publication: 2018

Issue: 52

Type: Article

More publications in: Revista de derecho de sociedades


In the second decade of the twentieth century the organization of the large corporation became the center of debate, almost simultaneously, in Germany and the USA. At that time the communication of ideas between the two shores of the Atlantic was fluid. The institutional vision of the corporation was shared, with duties towards the Society as a whole. However, it was then that they took the first steps, which in the long run would lead to the two systems, which constitute the reference poles in comparative corporate governance: stakeholder- and shareholder model. After the war, the exchange of ideas was interrupted and the debate came to pass through separate channels and largely isolated, until the 90s, when an unusual interest in comparative research in this area was awekaned. Financial globalization was the driving factor. Comparative studies in terms of economic efficiency multiplied, aimed at demonstrating the superiority of the US corporate governance system and persuading all countries, especially Europe, of the convenience of converging on it. In the time following the turbulent first decade of this century, in which the prestige of the American model was called into question, those economic analysis of static character seem to have lost some strength and historical and historical-comparative studies begin to proliferate, with a dynamic-evolutionary approach, in which the determining influence of the historical context (economic, social, political, cultural) becomes evident.

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