Bosquejo de un sujeto mínimo neuroafectivo

  1. Arias Domínguez, Asier
Revista:
Bajo palabra. Revista de filosofía

ISSN: 1576-3935,  1887-505X

Any de publicació: 2021

Títol de l'exemplar: Sujetos, personas e individuos: estudios sobre la individualidad

Número: 28

Pàgines: 61-79

Tipus: Article

DOI: 10.15366/BP2021.28.003 DIALNET GOOGLE SCHOLAR lock_openDialnet editor

Altres publicacions en: Bajo palabra. Revista de filosofía

Resum

Consciousness and the self are amongthe most debated topics in neuroscience.There is, however, no agreement on theproper way to articulate both notions.In this paper we explore the possibilitiesfor analyzing this conceptual joint fromthe vantage point of affective neuroscience. In doing so, we substantiate that theconceptual entanglements present in theliterature do not prevent the use of theoretical and empirical research on the fieldin order to make sense of the aforementioned conceptual joint.

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Fuente de los datos: Dialnet