The Physical, the Subjective, and the Social in the Debate on Personal IdentityA Critical and Historical Overview of Neo-Lockean Accounts

  1. Muñoz-Corcuera, Alfonso 1
  1. 1 Universidad Complutense de Madrid
    info

    Universidad Complutense de Madrid

    Madrid, España

    ROR 02p0gd045

Revue:
Bajo palabra. Revista de filosofía

ISSN: 1576-3935,  1887-505X

Année de publication: 2021

Titre de la publication: Sujetos, personas e individuos: estudios sobre la individualidad

Número: 28

Pages: 21-45

Type: Article

DOI: 10.15366/BP2021.28.001 DIALNET GOOGLE SCHOLAR lock_openDialnet editor

D'autres publications dans: Bajo palabra. Revista de filosofía

Résumé

There are, at least, three fundamentaldimensions in what we all are: a physical,a mental and a social dimension. In thispaper I will focus in how, in the historyof the debate about personal identity, different neo-Lockean theories have triedto account for these dimensions. Themain goal will be to show that the onlyneo-Lockean theory that can account forthese dimensions is what I call the NewNarrative Approach, that establishes adistinction between three entities thatwe are: human beings, selves, and persons.

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Information sur le financement

This research was funded by the Ministry of Science and Innovation of the Spanish Government through the Research Project “Institution and Constitution of Individuality: Ontological, Social and Legal Aspects” (PID2020-117413GA-I00 / AEI / 10.13039/501100011033).

Financeurs

    • PID2020-117413GA-I00 / AEI / 10.13039/501100011033

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