Desacuerdos profundos, elección de criterios y exigencia de coherencia
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Universidad Complutense de Madrid
info
ISSN: 2172-8801
Argitalpen urtea: 2021
Zenbakia: 22
Orrialdeak: 1-40
Mota: Artikulua
Beste argitalpen batzuk: Revista iberoamericana de argumentación
Laburpena
This paper intends to delve into the notion of deep disagreement expounded by Robert Fogelin, and compare Fogelin’s idea that deep disagreements emerge from a clash between two different conceptual (and even vital) frameworks or backgrounds with Kuhn’s concept of incommensurability. In turn, I argue that certain elements of said backgrounds are not entirely revisable via purely logical means (supporting Fogelin’s conclusion) and instead depend on a fundamental voluntary choice between different criteria on which to base one’s position (following Alasdair MacIntyre). Lastly, contraFogelin, I propose a method for the (partial) rational resolution of deep disagreements based on ad hominem argumentation (in Henry Johnstone’s sense) and argumentation by analogy, which I call “demand for coherence”.
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