Valores monótonos para juegos con cooperación imperfecta

  1. Martin Garcia, Daniel
Dirigée par:
  1. Conrado Miguel Manuel García Directeur

Université de défendre: Universidad Complutense de Madrid

Fecha de defensa: 20 octobre 2021

Jury:
  1. Juan Antonio Tejada Cazorla President
  2. Javier Castro Cantalejo Secrétaire
  3. Guillermo Owen Rapporteur
  4. Natividad Llorca Pascual Rapporteur
  5. Andrés Jiménez Losada Rapporteur
Département:
  1. Estadística y Ciencia de los Datos

Type: Thèses

Résumé

In last decades, game theory has become increasingly popular. Its usefulness in the analysis of strategic decision making have provided it a great success, so many researchers have focused their attention on this versatile tool. In the eld of analysis of strategic decision making, the variety of scenarios constantly grows. Hence, scientistshave realized the need for a formal and systematic modeling of strategic interactions. In last times, this area of mathematics and economics has received a great deal of support from the academic world. For example, many game theory experts have received the Nobel Price.In the eld of game theory, two categories can be clearly dierentiated. Both depend on the nature of the problem addressed. One of these categories is about noncooperativegames. On the other hand, we contemplate the case of cooperative games,which is the framework of this report. This classication is carried out depending on whether cooperation between the agents of the game is allowed or not...