Truth ascriptionsa new nature of truth

  1. David Bordonaba Plou 1
  1. 1 Universidad de Granada
    info

    Universidad de Granada

    Granada, España

    ROR https://ror.org/04njjy449

Revista:
Teorema: Revista internacional de filosofía

ISSN: 0210-1602

Año de publicación: 2016

Volumen: 35

Número: 1

Páginas: 115-127

Tipo: Artículo

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Otras publicaciones en: Teorema: Revista internacional de filosofía

Referencias bibliográficas

  • CHRISMAN, M. (2007), ‘From Epistemic Contextualism to Epistemic Expressivism’, Philosophical Studies, vol. 135(2), pp. 225-254.
  • FRÁPOLLI, M. J. (2013), The Nature of Truth: An Updated Approach to the Meaning of Truth Ascriptions, Dordretch, Springer.
  • GROVER, D., CAMP J. and BELNAP, N. (1975), ‘A Prosentential Theory of Truth’, Philosophical Studies, vol. 27, pp. 73-125.
  • HORWICH, P. (1998), Truth, Oxford, Oxford Universtity Press.
  • KAPLAN, D. (1989), ‘Demonstratives’, in Almog, J., Perry, J. and Wettstein, H. (eds.), Themes from Kaplan, New York, Oxford University Press, pp. 481-563.
  • MACFARLANE, J. (2014), Assessment Sensitivity: Relative Truth and Its Applications, New York, Oxford University Press.
  • RAMSEY, F. P. (1991), ‘The Nature of Truth’ in Rescher, N. and Majer, U. (eds.), On Truth. Original Manuscript Materials (1927-1929) from the Ramsey Collection at the University of Pittsburgh, Dordretch, Springer, pp. 84-94.
  • TARSKI, A. (1944), ‘The Semantic Conception of Truth: and the Foundations of Semantics’, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, vol. 4(3), pp. 341-376.
  • WILLIAMS, C. J. F. (1992), ‘The Prosentential Theory of Truth’, Reports on Philosophy vol. 15, pp. 147-154.
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