Plataformas digitales y compatibilidaduna vieja historia en un mundo nuevo

  1. Juan Manuel Sánchez-Cartas 1
  1. 1 Universidad Politécnica de Madrid
    info

    Universidad Politécnica de Madrid

    Madrid, España

    ROR https://ror.org/03n6nwv02

Revista:
Papeles de economía española

ISSN: 0210-9107

Año de publicación: 2018

Título del ejemplar: Portada publicación Análisis económico de la revolución digital

Número: 157

Páginas: 2-23

Tipo: Artículo

DIALNET GOOGLE SCHOLAR lock_openAcceso abierto editor

Otras publicaciones en: Papeles de economía española

Resumen

Las plataformas digitales se comunican entre sí. Intercambian datos sobre sus usuarios mediante protocolos comunes que crean redes de compatibilidad entre las plataformas. Sin embargo, la utilización que hacen de los datos no es homogénea; algunas plataformas comparten los datos de forma gratuita, mientras que otras los venden. En este artículo se analiza el papel de la compartición de datos entre plataformas, y cómo afecta ese comportamiento a la intuición económica tradicional. Se describe la función que desempeñan los datos en la nueva generación de plataformas digitales; cómo en algunos casos sigue siendo válido el marco económico clásico; y los nuevos comportamientos que son exclusivos de las plataformas digitales. Para terminar, nuestras conclusiones se contextualizan en un análisis del mercado de los dispositivos de actividad física (fitness trackers).

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Fuente de los datos: Dialnet