Desacuerdo sin falta y retractaciónuna defensa del relativismo sobre juicios de gusto

  1. Bordonaba, David 1
  1. 1 Universidad de Granada
    info

    Universidad de Granada

    Granada, España

    ROR https://ror.org/04njjy449

Revista:
Ideas y valores: Revista Colombiana de Filosofía

ISSN: 0120-0062

Año de publicación: 2019

Volumen: 68

Número: 170

Páginas: 205-228

Tipo: Artículo

DOI: 10.15446/IDEASYVALORES.V68N170.62774 DIALNET GOOGLE SCHOLAR lock_openDialnet editor

Otras publicaciones en: Ideas y valores: Revista Colombiana de Filosofía

Resumen

El objetivo de este trabajo es doble. Primero, analizar el desacuerdo sin falta, fenómeno central en el debate sobre el significado de los juicios de gusto, y examinar cómo las distintas posiciones que toman parte en dicho debate –contextualismo deíctico, contextualismo no deíctico y relativismo– dan cuenta de este fenómeno. Segundo, defender que tanto el contextualismo no deíctico como el relativismo pueden dar cuenta de él, pero que solo el segundo de ellos puede hacerlo a la vez que acomoda un fenómeno que parece central en la explicación de este tipo de desacuerdos, la retractación.

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