El problema de la justificación del conocimiento básico

  1. García Arnaldos, María Dolores 1
  1. 1 Universidad CEU-San Pablo (Madrid). PhD USC ORCID: 0000-0001-9998-8060
Revista:
Anales del seminario de historia de la filosofía

ISSN: 0211-2337

Año de publicación: 2019

Volumen: 36

Volumen: 1

Páginas: 243-259

Tipo: Artículo

DOI: 10.5209/ASHF.63369 DIALNET GOOGLE SCHOLAR lock_openAcceso abierto editor

Otras publicaciones en: Anales del seminario de historia de la filosofía

Resumen

El objeto de este artículo es analizar el problema de la justificación del conocimiento básico y ofrecer una solución basada en un tipo de justificación deflacionaria no-evidencialista a partir de la noción de habilitación (entitlement) de T. Burge y la de garantía racional de C. Wright. El problema, en el caso del conocimiento básico lógico, es que justificar las reglas lógicas inferencialmente supone utilizar principios lógicos, con lo cual se genera un círculo vicioso. Examinamos la viabilidad del enfoque no-inferencialista de Wright y sostendremos que una garantía racional es una respuesta viable para el problema de la justificación del conocimiento lógico básico.

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