Coordination of contexts and taste disagreements

  1. Bordonaba Plou, David 1
  1. 1 Universidad de Granada
    info

    Universidad de Granada

    Granada, España

    ROR https://ror.org/04njjy449

Revista:
Daimon: revista internacional de filosofía

ISSN: 1130-0507,  1989-4651

Any de publicació: 2020

Número: 80

Pàgines: 169-184

Tipus: Article

DOI: 10.6018/DAIMON.332591 DIALNET GOOGLE SCHOLAR lock_openAccés obert editor

Altres publicacions en: Daimon: revista internacional de filosofía

Resum

In this paper, I will defend that there is an asymmetry between straightforwardly factual and non-straightforwardly factual disagreements (Field 2009) in terms of persistency and retraction, and that we can use what I will call coordination of contexts to explain these two asymmetries. To make my point I will focus on the kinematics of this type of disagreements. I will argue that one way to give a proper account of the kinematics of disagreements about taste and to discriminate between these two cases of disagreement is to focus on coordination of contexts.

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Informació de finançament

This article has partly been elaborated in the framework of the project A Computational Dynamic Analysis of Public Debates on Politics, Aesthetics and Taste, funded by CONICYT FONDECYT/POSTDOCTORADO/ N? Proyecto 3180096. I am grateful to Manuel de Pinedo Garc?a, Mar?a Jos? Fr?polli Sanz, Laila Miriam Jreis Navarro, Neftal? Villanueva Fern?ndez and two anonymous referees for fruitful comments.

Finançadors

    • 3180096

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