Essays on electoral rules

Résumé

This thesis is divided into three self-contained chapters on political economics. Although the topics of these articles may seem at first look completely different they contain as a common denominator political parties and electoral rules as the two key elements. Political parties are the key players of the game of government formation and in this game the electoral rule per se is also important as it describes the rules of the game. In modern societies the government is probably the most important influence on economic and social policies and these policies affect the well being of the whole society. Therefore, the analysis of governments and the elements which affect its formation have been of primary interest not only in political science but also in the economics literature. This thesis aims to form part of this vast literature. In the first chapter I analyze a three party electoral competition under both plurality rule and run-off rule where the aim is to focus on how these rules affect the chance of winning the elections of a centrist candidate. In the following chapter I analyze the decision of a parliament that might change the electoral system for the forthcoming elections from plurality rule to proportional representation where the aim is to find the conditions such a change would occur. In the last chapter, I analyze the process of stable coalition government formation in a two dimensional political environment where one of the dimensions is the degree of a proportional tax rate and the other dimension represents the degree of a group specific public good.