The Chances of Propensities

  1. Suárez, Mauricio
Revista:
The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science

ISSN: 0007-0882,  1464-3537

Año de publicación: 2018

Volumen: 69

Número: 4

Páginas: 1155-1177

Tipo: Artículo

DOI: 10.1093/BJPS/AXX010 GOOGLE SCHOLAR

Otras publicaciones en: The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science

Resumen

This article argues that if propensities are displayed in objective physical chances, thenthe appropriate representation of these chances is as indexed probability functions. Twoalternative formal models or accounts for the relation between propensity properties andtheir chancy or probabilistic manifestations, in terms of conditionals and conditionalprobability, are first reviewed. It is argued that both confront important objections,which are overcome by the account in terms of indexed probabilities. A number of furtheradvantages of the indexed probability account are discussed, which suggest that it ispromising as a general theory of objective physical chance. The article ends with a discussion of the indexical character of the objective chances that are grounded inpropensities.

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