Derecho derrengado y la esencialidad filosófica del Derecho

Abstract

When we refer to the idea of law, it is unacceptable that its essence should be determined by the utilitarian use made of it in social reality. It is even less acceptable to say that its essence is determined by the struggle of selfish interests and the desire for domination of political and economic powers. Nor is it acceptable to say that its essence is determined by the result of its practical exercise. For if the end it pursues and the result is another, to which it owes its existence, then law loses its essence and ceases to be law. If the idea of law is no longer seen as a value of its own and loses its essence of being the historical response of societies to the question of justice, then law is irremediably perverted and ends up transformed into a common tool without its own essential feature or characteristic; that is, it becomes an ethically neutral instrument used according to the whim of certain particularistic interests. Law thus becomes without its own value and without essence, its merit being determined merely by its usefulness in obtaining ends that are alien to it. Law would be defined by the services it can provide in a useful and efficient way, losing its ethical value and its very roots.