Endogenous learning in international environmental agreements: the impact of research spillovers and the degree of cooperation

  1. André, Francisco J 2
  2. Finus, Michael 1
  1. 1 Institute of Economics, School of Business, Economics and Social Sciences, University of Graz , Universitätsstrasse 15 , Graz 8010, Austria
  2. 2 Department of Economic Analysis and ICAE, Universidad Complutense de Madrid , Campus de Somosaguas 28223 , Madrid, Spain
Revista:
Oxford Economic Papers

ISSN: 0030-7653,  1464-3812

Año de publicación: 2023

Tipo: Artículo

DOI: 10.1093/OEP/GPAD047 GOOGLE SCHOLAR lock_openAcceso abierto editor

Otras publicaciones en: Oxford Economic Papers

Resumen

We consider an endogenous learning-by-doing process where countries can invest in research that reduces the systematic uncertainty about climate change damages. We analyse a coalition model in which countries decide whether to join a treaty and then choose their level of research and abatement. Countries can cooperate on research and abatement or only on one of these items. We consider the entire range of possible research spillovers. Cooperation on all issues and large research spillovers are generally welfare improving, but lead to smaller coalitions, as they encourage free-riding. However, on balance, in equilibrium, we find that cooperation should not be confined to research and should include abatement, and research findings should freely travel.

€ Ver financiación

Información de financiación

Financiadores

Referencias bibliográficas

  • Amir, (2000), International Journal of Industrial Organization, 18, pp. 1013, 10.1016/S0167-7187(00)00071-0
  • Barrett, (1994), Oxford Economic Papers, 46, pp. 878, 10.1093/oep/46.Supplement_1.878
  • Barrett, (2002), Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 158, pp. 529, 10.1628/0932456022975169
  • Barrett, (2006), American Economic Review, 96, pp. 22, 10.1257/000282806777212332
  • Boucher, (2010), Journal of Public Economics, 94, pp. 591, 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2010.06.008
  • Bramoullé, (2009), Journal of the European Economic Association, 7, pp. 1042, 10.1162/JEEA.2009.7.5.1042
  • Cabral, (2000), International Journal of Industrial Organization, 18, pp. 1033, 10.1016/S0167-7187(99)00011-9
  • Carraro, (2006), The Review of International Organizations, 1, pp. 379, 10.1007/s11558-006-0162-5
  • Carraro, (1993), Journal of Public Economics, 52, pp. 309, 10.1016/0047-2727(93)90037-T
  • Dahm, (2008), Social Choice and Welfare, 30, pp. 531, 10.1007/s00355-007-0264-x
  • Dahm, (2009), Journal of Health Economics, 28, pp. 1141, 10.1016/j.jhealeco.2009.08.004
  • El-Sayed, (2014), Resource and Energy Economics, 38, pp. 168, 10.1016/j.reseneeco.2014.07.003
  • Endres, (2015), Social Choice and Welfare, 44, pp. 151, 10.1007/s00355-014-0826-7
  • Eyckmans, (2012), pp. 6
  • Finus, (2015), Game Theory and International Environmental Cooperation: Essential Readings, 10.4337/9781784713201
  • Finus, (2008), Journal of Public Economic Theory, 10, pp. 801, 10.1111/j.1467-9779.2008.00387.x
  • Finus, (2019), Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 157, pp. 541, 10.1016/j.jebo.2018.10.015
  • Finus, (2012), Oxford Economic Papers, 64, pp. 736, 10.1093/oep/gpr054
  • Finus, (2013), Journal of Public Economics, 103, pp. 29, 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2013.04.003
  • Fuentes-Albero, (2010), European Journal of Operational Research, 202, pp. 255, 10.1016/j.ejor.2009.05.006
  • Hoel, (2010), Environmental and Resource Economics, 47, pp. 395, 10.1007/s10640-010-9384-3
  • Hong, (2014), Journal of the Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, 1, pp. 365, 10.1086/677940
  • Kamien, (1992), American Economic Review, 82, pp. 1293
  • Karp, (2013), Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 65, pp. 326, 10.1016/j.jeem.2012.09.002
  • Karp, (2006), Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 51, pp. 259, 10.1016/j.jeem.2005.09.006
  • Kellenberg, (2014), Journal of the Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, 1, pp. 135, 10.1086/676037
  • Kolstad, (2007), Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 53, pp. 68, 10.1016/j.jeem.2006.08.001
  • Kolstad, (2008), Climatic Change, 89, pp. 125, 10.1007/s10584-008-9399-8
  • Masoudi, (2016), Environmental and Resource Economics, 64, pp. 349, 10.1007/s10640-014-9873-x
  • Na, (1998), Oxford Economic Papers, 50, pp. 173, 10.1093/oxfordjournals.oep.a028640
  • Nkuiya, (2015), Journal of Public Economic Theory, 17, pp. 752, 10.1111/jpet.12108
  • Pavlova, (2013), Environment and Development Economics, 18, pp. 51, 10.1017/S1355770X12000289
  • Rubio, (2017), Oxford Economic Papers, 69, pp. 496
  • Ulph, (2004), Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 29, pp. 53, 10.1023/B:RISK.0000031445.13939.e4
  • Weikard, (2009), The Manchester School, 77, pp. 575, 10.1111/j.1467-9957.2009.02111.x
  • Yi, (1997), Games and Economic Behavior, 20, pp. 201, 10.1006/game.1997.0567