Tipología y disposiciones del organismo en la evo-devouna aproximación metafísica

  1. Villegas, Cristina 1
  2. Triviño, Vanessa 2
  1. 1 Centro de Filosofia das Ciências da Universidade de Lisboa, Portugal
  2. 2 Universidad Complutense de Madrid
    info

    Universidad Complutense de Madrid

    Madrid, España

    ROR 02p0gd045

Revista:
Artefactos

ISSN: 1989-3612

Año de publicación: 2023

Título del ejemplar: Philosophy of Organismal Biology: From Ontogeny to Ecology and Evolution

Volumen: 12

Número: 1

Páginas: 79-102

Tipo: Artículo

DOI: 10.14201/ART202312179102 DIALNET GOOGLE SCHOLAR lock_openAcceso abierto editor

Otras publicaciones en: Artefactos

Resumen

En este artículo, abordamos el problema de cómo se pueden entender las tendencias variacionales que se atribuyen a los rasgos homólogos en evo-devo. Tras resaltar que las teorías actuales sobre la homología no dan suficiente cuenta de por qué, de hecho, los rasgos varían, proponemos una caracterización de los mismos como tipos naturales disposicionales. Para ello, recurrimos a las herramientas que ofrece la metafísica respecto a la caracterización de las propiedades disposicionales. Teniendo en cuenta este marco, consideramos que solo atribuyendo a los rasgos (entendidos como tipos naturales) la disposición de variar, puede darse cuenta del poder causal y explicativo de los mismos en evo-devo. Este caso de estudio ilustra, además, un tipo de interacción entre metafísica y biología al que denominamos “metafísica desde la biología”, en que las exigencias específicas de una realidad tan compleja como la evolución demanda unas nociones metafísicas que van más allá de las consideradas en la literatura.

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Fuente de los datos: Dialnet