On the Analogy between Cognitive Representation and Truth

  1. Suárez, Mauricio
  2. Solé, Albert
Revista:
Theoria: an international journal for theory, history and foundations of science

ISSN: 0495-4548

Año de publicación: 2006

Volumen: 21

Número: 55

Páginas: 39-48

Tipo: Artículo

DIALNET GOOGLE SCHOLAR lock_openDialnet editor

Otras publicaciones en: Theoria: an international journal for theory, history and foundations of science

Resumen

In this paper we claim that the notion of cognitive representation (and scientific representation in particular) is irreducibly plural. By means of an analogy with the minimalist conception of truth, we show that this pluralism is compatible with a generally deflationary attitude towards representation. We then explore the extent and nature of representational pluralism by discussing the positive and negative analogies between the inferential conception of representation advocated by one of us and the minimalist conception of truth.

Referencias bibliográficas

  • Bailer-Jones, D. M. (2003). "When Scientific Models Represent", International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 17: 59-74
  • Giere, Ronald (1999). Science Without Truth. University of Chicago Press
  • - (forthcoming). Scientific Perspectives. University of Chicago Press
  • Horwich, Paul (1998). Truth. Oxford: Blackwell
  • Lynch, Michael (2001). "A Functionalist Theory of Truth", in Michael Lynch (ed.), The Nature of Truth. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press
  • Suárez, Mauricio (2003). "Scientific Representation: Against Similarity and Isomorphism", International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 17 (3): 225-244
  • - (2004). "An Inferential Conception of Scientific Representation", Philosophy of Science 71: 767-779
  • Wright, Crispin (1992). Truth and Objectivity. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press
  • - (2003). Saving the Differences. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press
Fuente de los datos: Dialnet