El modelo británico de nombramientos judiciales«Judicial independence in law»

  1. Fernández Riveira, Rosa María 1
  1. 1 Universidad Complutense de Madrid
    info

    Universidad Complutense de Madrid

    Madrid, España

    ROR 02p0gd045

Revista:
Teoría y realidad constitucional

ISSN: 1139-5583

Año de publicación: 2019

Número: 44

Páginas: 453-482

Tipo: Artículo

DOI: 10.5944/TRC.44.2019.26014 DIALNET GOOGLE SCHOLAR lock_openDialnet editor

Otras publicaciones en: Teoría y realidad constitucional

Resumen

La ley de reforma constitucional de 2005 en el Reino Unido ha significado un cambio constitucional sin precedentes. Estas páginas analizan el modelo anterior a la reforma aludida, el contenido de esta reforma y sus importantes efectos en el Poder Judicial. El viejo sistema es descrito y comentado y después se exponen los principales contenidos de la reforma, centrándose en la creación de la JAC la Judicial Appointments Commission que es órgano público creado para nombrar a la Judicatura del Reino Unido. Por último se analizan los efectos positivos y negativos de un nuevo modelo que sin duda ha rediseñado el poder judicial en este país.

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