Bosquejo de un sujeto mínimo neuroafectivo

Referencias bibliográficas

• Alcaro, A., Carta, S. y Panksepp, J. (2017). The affective core of the self: A neuro-archetypical perspective on the foundations of human (and animal) subjectivity, Frontiers Psychology, 8, art. 1424. DOI: https://doi.org/10.3389/ fpsyg.2017.01424
• Barron, A. B. y Klein, C. (2016). What insects can tell us about the origins of consciousness, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, 113, pp. 4900-4908. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1073/ pnas.1520084113
• Damasio, A. R. (1998). Investigating the biology of consciousness, Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London. Series B: Biological Sciences, 353, pp. 1879-1882. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1098/rstb.1998.0339
• Damasio, A. R. (1999). The Feeling of what Happens: Body and Emotion in the Making of Consciousness. Harcourt Brace y Co. [Trad. de F. Páez de la Cadena. Destino, 2018].
• Damasio, A. R. (2003a). Looking for Spinoza: Joy, Sorrow, and the Feeling Brain. William Heinemann. [Trad. de J. Ros. Destino, 2011].
• Damasio, A. R. (2003b). A reply to Jaak Panksepp and Douglas Watt, Neuro-Psychoanalysis, 5, pp. 215-218.
• Damasio, A. R. (2010). Self Comes to Mind: Constructing the Conscious Brain. Pantheon. [Trad. de F. Meler Orti. Destino, 2010].
• Damasio, A. R. (2018). The Strange Order of Things: Life, Feeling, and the Making of Cultures. Pantheon. [Trad. de J. Ros. Destino, 2018].
• Damasio, A. R. y Carvalho, G. B. (2013). The nature of feelings: Evolutionary and neurobiological origins, Nature Reviews Neuroscience, 14, pp. 143-152. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1038/nrn3403
• Denton, D. A. (2005). The Primordial Emotions: The Dawning of Consciousness. Oxford University Press. [Trad. de J. Ros. Paidós, 2009].
• Díaz, J. L. y Vargas Pérez, H. (2005). El enigma de la conciencia animal, en A. Escotto-Córdova y I. Grande-García (eds.), Enfoques sobre el estudio de la conciencia. UNAM, pp. 229-302.
• Gallagher, S. (2000). Philosophical conceptions of the self: Implications for cognitive science, Trends in Cognitive Science, 4, pp. 14-21. DOI: https://doi. org/10.1016/S1364-6613(99)01417-5
• Gallagher, S. y Zahavi, D. (2012). The Phenomenological Mind (2nd ed.). Routledge.
• Godfrey-Smith, P. (2016). Other Minds: The Octopus, the Sea, and the Deep Origins of Consciousness. Straus and Giroux. [Trad. de J. Ros. Taurus, 2017].
• Godfrey-Smith, P. (2018). The evolution of consciousness in phylogenetic context, en K. Andrews y J. Beck (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Animal Minds. Routledge, pp. 216-226.
• Godfrey-Smith, P. (2019). Evolving across the explanatory gap, Philosophy, Theory, and Practice in Biology, 11, pp. 1-24. DOI: https://doi.org/10.3998/ptpbio.16039257.0011.001
• Lane, T. J. (2020). The minimal self hypothesis, Consciousness and Cognition, 85, art. 103029. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.concog.2020.103029
• LeDoux, J. E. (2002). Synaptic self: How our brains become who we are. Viking.
• LeDoux, J. E. (2003). The self: Clues from the brain. Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences, 1001, pp. 295-304. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1196/annals.1279.017
• LeDoux, J. E. y Brown, R. (2017). A higher-order theory of emotional consciousness, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, 114 (10), pp. 2016-2025. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1619316114
• López Corredoira, M. (2009). Algunas respuestas a las críticas al materialismo en el problema mente-cerebro, en C. Diosdado Gómez, F. Rodríguez Valls y J. Arana Cañedo-Argüelles (coords.), Neurofilosofía: Perspectivas contemporáneas. Plaza y Valdés, pp. 129-140.
• Nagel, T. (1974). What is it like to be a bat? The Philosophical Review, 83, pp. 435-450.
• Panksepp, J. (1998a). The periconscious substrates of consciousness: Affective states and the evolutionary origins of the SELF, Journal of Consciousness Studies, 5, 566-582.
• Panksepp, J. (1998b). Affective Neuroscience: The Foundations of Human and Animal Emotions. Oxford University Press.
• Panksepp, J. (2003). Damasio’s error? Consciousness y Emotion, 4, pp. 111-134. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1075/ce.4.1.10pan
• Panksepp, J. (2005). Affective consciousness: Core emotional feelings in animals and humans, Consciousness and Cognition, 14, pp. 30-80. DOI: doi: https://doi. org/10.1016/j.concog.2004.10.004.
• Panksepp, J. (2007). Affective consciousness, en M. Velmans y S. Schneider (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to Consciousness. Blackwell, pp. 114-129.
• Panksepp, J. (2008). The affective brain and core-consciousness: How does neural activity generate emotional feelings?, en M. Lewis, J. M., Haviland y L. F. Barrett (eds.), Handbook of Emotions. Guilford, pp. 47-67.
• Panksepp, J. (2010). Affective neuroscience of the emotional BrainMind: evolutionary perspectives and implications for understanding depression, Dialogues in Clinical Neuroscience, 12, pp. 533-545. DOI: 10.31887/DCNS.2010.12.4/ jpanksepp
• Panksepp, J. (2011a). The basic emotional circuits of mammalian brains: Do animals have affective lives?, Neuroscience and Biobehavioral Reviews, 35, pp.1791- 1804. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.neubiorev.2011.08.003
• Panksepp, J. (2011b). Cross-species affective neuroscience decoding of the primal affective experiences of humans and related animals, PloS One, 6, pp. 1-15. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0021236
• Panksepp, J. (2012). Do animals have emotional lives?, en C. Jakobsson (ed.), Sustainable Agriculture. Baltic University Press, pp. 316-323.
• Panksepp, J., Asma, S., Curran, G., Gabriel, R. y Greif, T. (2012). The philosophical implications of affective neuroscience, Journal of Consciousness Studies, 19(3-4), pp. 6-48.
• Panksepp, J. y Biven, L. (2012). The Archaeology of Mind: Neuroevolutionary Origins of Human Emotions. Norton.
• Panksepp, J. y Northoff, G. (2009). The trans-species core SELF: The emergence of active cultural and neuro-ecological agents through self-related processing within subcortical-cortical midline networks, Consciousness and Cognition, 18, pp. 193-215. DOI: 10.1016/j.concog.2008.03.002
• Panksepp, J. y Watt, D. (2003). The ego is first and foremost a body ego, Neuro-Psychoanalysis, 5, pp. 201-215.
• Pecere, P. (2020). Soul, Mind and Brain from Descartes to Cognitive Science: A Critical History. Springer.
• Shear, J. (1998). Experiential clarification of the problem of self, Journal of Consciousness Studies, 5(5-6), pp. 673-686.
• Strawson, G. (1997). The self, Journal of Consciousness Studies, 4(5-6), pp. 405- 428.
• Strawson, G. (1999). The self and the SESMET, Journal of Consciousness Studies, 6(4), pp. 99-135.
• Strawson, G. (2006). Realistic monism: Why physicalism entails panpsychism, Journal of Consciousness Studies, 13(10-11), pp. 3-31.
• Strawson, G. (2010). Radical self-awareness, en M. Siderits, E. Thompson y D. Zahavi (eds.), Self, No Self? Perspectives From Analytical, Phenomenological and Indian Traditions. Oxford University Press, pp. 274-307.
• Zahavi, D. (2014). Self and Other: Exploring Subjectivity, Empathy, and Shame. Oxford University Press.