The Physical, the Subjective, and the Social in the Debate on Personal IdentityA Critical and Historical Overview of Neo-Lockean Accounts

  1. Muñoz-Corcuera, Alfonso 1
  1. 1 Universidad Complutense de Madrid
    info

    Universidad Complutense de Madrid

    Madrid, España

    ROR 02p0gd045

Revista:
Bajo palabra. Revista de filosofía

ISSN: 1576-3935,  1887-505X

Año de publicación: 2021

Título del ejemplar: Sujetos, personas e individuos: estudios sobre la individualidad

Número: 28

Páginas: 21-45

Tipo: Artículo

DOI: 10.15366/BP2021.28.001 DIALNET GOOGLE SCHOLAR lock_openDialnet editor

Otras publicaciones en: Bajo palabra. Revista de filosofía

Resumen

Existen al menos tres dimensionesfundamentales en aquello que todos nosotros somos: una dimensión física, unamental y otra social. En este artículo mecentraré en cómo, en la historia del debate sobre la identidad personal desde unapostura neo-lockeana, se ha tratado dedar cuenta de las tres dimensiones. El objetivo será demostrar que la única teoríaneolockeana que ha sido capaz de hacerloes lo que denomino la Nueva Perspectiva Narrativa, caracterizada por estableceruna distinción entre tres entidades quesomos: seres humanos, yoes y personas.

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Información de financiación

This research was funded by the Ministry of Science and Innovation of the Spanish Government through the Research Project “Institution and Constitution of Individuality: Ontological, Social and Legal Aspects” (PID2020-117413GA-I00 / AEI / 10.13039/501100011033).

Financiadores

    • PID2020-117413GA-I00 / AEI / 10.13039/501100011033

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