Decisiones, emergencia y valor. Lo que hacen las personas y lo que piensan que harán en una emergencia

  1. Gavilan, Diana 1
  2. Martínez-Navarro, Gema 2
  1. 1 Unversidad Complutense de Madrid
  2. 2 Universidad Complutense de Madrid
    info

    Universidad Complutense de Madrid

    Madrid, España

    ROR 02p0gd045

Journal:
Prisma Social: revista de investigación social

ISSN: 1989-3469

Year of publication: 2019

Issue Title: La Investigación en la Educación Superior y su Impacto Social

Issue: 27

Pages: 86-103

Type: Article

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More publications in: Prisma Social: revista de investigación social

Abstract

Individuals, scientists and organizations have questioned on more than one occasion the degree of rationality underlying human being decisions. It has been observed that, in situations of uncertainty, the aversion to loss imprints an important fragility on the way of deciding. This leads to the question of what will happen when a choice is made in an emergency - will the choice made outside the emergency context coincide with that made in an emergency? This research addresses both situations and analyses differences and similarities between how a decision is made in an emergency and how it is thought to be made in an emergency. In an attempt to answer these questions, a double experiment has been carried out, a staged quasi-analytical simulation (hot state) and a virtual simulation (cold state), the results of which corroborate the existence of discrepancies between the decisions people take and those people think they would take. The results provide new perspectives on the meaning of value, the endowment effect, and the importance that society attaches to the everyday objects.

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