Causal dispositionalism in behaviour genetics

  1. Cerezo, María
Revista:
Behavioral and Brain Sciences

ISSN: 0140-525X,  1469-1825

Any de publicació: 2023

Volum: 46

Pàgines: 26-27

Tipus: Article

DOI: 10.1017/S0140525X22002060 GOOGLE SCHOLAR lock_openAccés obert editor

Altres publicacions en: Behavioral and Brain Sciences

Resum

Causal dispositionalism developed in metaphysics of science offers a useful tool to conceptualize shallow causes in behaviour genetics, in a way such that (a) it accounts for complex aetiology and heterogeneity of effects, and (b) genetic causal contribution can be considered to be explanatory. Genes are thus causal powers that make a difference.

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