Causal dispositionalism in behaviour genetics
ISSN: 0140-525X, 1469-1825
Ano de publicación: 2023
Volume: 46
Páxinas: 26-27
Tipo: Artigo
Outras publicacións en: Behavioral and Brain Sciences
Resumo
Causal dispositionalism developed in metaphysics of science offers a useful tool to conceptualize shallow causes in behaviour genetics, in a way such that (a) it accounts for complex aetiology and heterogeneity of effects, and (b) genetic causal contribution can be considered to be explanatory. Genes are thus causal powers that make a difference.
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