Causal dispositionalism in behaviour genetics
ISSN: 0140-525X, 1469-1825
Datum der Publikation: 2023
Ausgabe: 46
Seiten: 26-27
Art: Artikel
Andere Publikationen in: Behavioral and Brain Sciences
Zusammenfassung
Causal dispositionalism developed in metaphysics of science offers a useful tool to conceptualize shallow causes in behaviour genetics, in a way such that (a) it accounts for complex aetiology and heterogeneity of effects, and (b) genetic causal contribution can be considered to be explanatory. Genes are thus causal powers that make a difference.
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