Causal dispositionalism in behaviour genetics
ISSN: 0140-525X, 1469-1825
Argitalpen urtea: 2023
Alea: 46
Orrialdeak: 26-27
Mota: Artikulua
Beste argitalpen batzuk: Behavioral and Brain Sciences
Laburpena
Causal dispositionalism developed in metaphysics of science offers a useful tool to conceptualize shallow causes in behaviour genetics, in a way such that (a) it accounts for complex aetiology and heterogeneity of effects, and (b) genetic causal contribution can be considered to be explanatory. Genes are thus causal powers that make a difference.
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